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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

NIC - 00024/84

3 January 1984

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John Horton
NIO/LA

SUBJECT: SIG/NSPG on Central America

Here are telegrams from Negroponte,
Pickering, and Ferch, on the Contadora process.
They're not must reading but background reading.
Contadora will be getting more attention around
town.

John Horton
John Horton

Attachments:
as stated

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CONFIDENTIALNIO/LA
INCOMING

05/ /

IMMEDIATE

FRP: .2, .4, . . . ,8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/ES-2, ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/R, ALA/PO/LA, CRW,
 ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OGI/DD/E, OGI/EC/TW, OGI/IIC/IB, OPCTR/EALA,
 PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/PA/F/S, SOV/PA/S,
 TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3, LA/RR, D/OCR-3, NICAG/LA, NIO/ECON, NIO/LA,
 (11/W)

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PAGE 001

NC 3009539

TOR: 310038Z DEC 83

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 DE RUEHSN #2078/O1 3641826
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 O 301824Z DEC 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1696
 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 12078

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, XK
 SUBJECT: CONTADORA NEXT STEPS

REF: (A) PANAMA 12533, (B) TEGUCIGALPA 14179
 (C) SAN JOSE 8861, (D) GUATEMALA 11264

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WILL BE SEEING FIDEL CHAVEZ MENA TOMORROW TO DIS-
 CUSS THE CORE FOUR APPROACH TO THE CONTADORA. I AM
 IMPRESSED AS NEVER BEFORE IN MY SHORT TIME HERE IN THE
 REGION WITH BOTH THE DEGREE OF DISARRAY AMONG THE CORE
 FOUR AND OUR OWN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM--WE HAVE
 HEARD NOTHING FROM THE DEPARTMENT SINCE OUR MIAMI MEET-
 ING--AS WELL AS THE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF A "FRACASO"
 LOOMING AHEAD FOR US IN THE FUTURE.

3. TWO CABLES RECEIVED THIS MORNING (REFS C AND D)
 INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CORE FOUR WILL BE PRESSED
 INTERNALLY BY GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA TO PRODUCE
 IN MID-JANUARY THEIR FORTY ARTICLE TREATY. NOT HAVING
 SEEN THE TREATY, AND SHARING MANY OF THE SAME CONCERNS
 AS EXPRESSED IN REF B, I WONDER WHETHER NOW IS NOT THE
 TIME TO SEEK TO COUNSEL WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE CORE
 FOUR MORE CLOSELY ON THEIR NEXT STEPS.

4. THE PRIMARY DANGER I SEE LOOMING AHEAD IS THE ONE
 POINTED OUT BY TEGUCIGALPA--THAT ALL THE DOCUMENTS WILL
 BE THROWN TOGETHER ON THE TABLE, THE CONTADORA GROUP
 WILL GO IN A CORNER AND THE END RESULT WILL BE THE
 PRODUCTION OF A NEW COMPROMISE DOCUMENT "TAKING INTO
 ACCOUNT EVERYONE'S VIEWS" BUT IN REALITY IT WILL BE A
 COMPROMISE HIGHLY UNACCEPTABLE TO OUR FRIENDS AND THUS
 TO US.

5. I AGREE WITH TONY QUANTON THAT WE CANNOT FIGHT
 SOMETHING WITH NOTHING, AND THAT PROCEDURE WILL NOT
 SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE AVALANCHE
 OF NICARAGUAN TREATIES AND THE PARTIALLY ACCEPTABLE AND
 SOMEWHAT HALF-BAKED CONTADORA FORMULATIONS NOW STARING
 US IN THE FACE. IF THIS IS INDEED THE CASE, WE WILL
 NEED QUICKLY TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH OUR CORE FOUR
 FRIENDS.

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6. THE NEXT STEPS FOR US SEEM CLEAR FROM HERE:

(1) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE OUR CORE FOUR FRIENDS TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN COMMENTARY ON THE PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES CAUSED FOR THEM AND THE PROCESS BY THE NICARAGUAN TREATIES.

(2) WE SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THEM TO COME QUICKLY TO A CONCLUSION ABOUT THE MOST RECENT CONTADORA DOCUMENT. IN THIS REGARD WE THINK THE EARLY COMMENTS PRODUCED IN REFTELS ARE IMPORTANT. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ALSO ADOPT QUICKLY AN ANALYSIS OR ASSESSMENT WHICH WE CAN SHARE WITH THEM TO INDICATE THE PITFALLS. IN RETURN THEY MIGHT THEN PREPARE AN ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY TO APPEND TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PREPARED.

(3) THE KEY ISSUE WILL BE WHAT THE CORE FOUR CAN AND SHOULD ADVANCE ON SUBSTANCE. THEIR TREATY DOCUMENT LENDS ITSELF TO FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF BECOMING JUST ANOTHER CONTRIBUTION TO A QUICK AND DIRTY CONTADORA COMPROMISE. IF THAT HAPPENS, THEN THE WEIGHT OF WORLD OPINION AND ALL OF OUR PAST SUPPORT FOR THE CONTADORA PROCESS CAN WELL AND EASILY BE TURNED AGAINST US, AND WE WILL HAVE TO FIGHT WITH OUR FRIENDS AN UPHILL BATTLE AGAINST A HIGHLY UNWELCOME RESULT. BUT IF OUR FRIENDS CAN PRODUCE A DOCUMENT WHICH INCORPORATES THE MAJOR POINTS WHICH THEY BELIEVE MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN IMPLEMENTING THE TWENTY-ONE POINTS, SUCH A DOCUMENT--MOST CERTAINLY NOT A TREATY TEXT--COULD BECOME THE BASIS FOR THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS AND MOST IMPORTANTLY THE FUTURE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE DOCUMENT WE ARE DISCUSSING HERE COULD WELL BE WHAT TEGUCIGALPA HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY SUGGESTED AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD PARALLEL THE RECENTLY PREPARED CORE FOUR TREATY TEXT BUT NOT BE SET FORTH IN TREATY LANGUAGE.

(4) THE DOCUMENT IN (3) ABOVE MIGHT BE COORDINATED WITH THE CORE FOUR DECISION TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THE HONDURAN IDEA ON WORKING GROUPS. SINCE THIS IS ALREADY IN PLACE, THE DOCUMENT IN (3) MIGHT WELL INCLUDE NOT ONLY SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS BUT CLEAR SUGGESTIONS FOR A

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XK

SUBJECT: CONTADORA NEXT STEPS

NEGOTIATING AGENDA OR PROGRAM FOR EACH OF THE WORKING GROUPS. THUS THE CORE FOUR COULD COMBINE A SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH WHILE AVOIDING THE PROBLEM OF HAVING THEIR TREATY PICKED UP AND GROUND INTO THE CONTADORA PROCESS TO EMERGE IN SOME LESS RECOGNIZABLE AND ACCEPTABLE FORM IN THE FUTURE.

7. SINCE I WILL BE SEEING CHAVEZ MENA TOMORROW, THERE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO REFLECT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS AND REACT. HOWEVER, I WOULD APPRECIATE SOME EARLY THOUGHTS FROM WASHINGTON ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED NEXT, AND I BELIEVE MY COLLEAGUES IN THE AREA WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR REACTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

PICKERING

END OF MESSAGE

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CONFIDENTIALNIO/LA
INCOMING

05/ /

IMMEDIATE

FRP: .2. .4. . . .8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/HO-2, ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/R, ALA/PO/LA,
 ALA/SA/R, ALA/SEM, ALA/SW/SW1, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OGI/EC/CM,
 OGI/EC/TM1, OGI/EC/TW, OGI/EC/TW1, OGI/GD/AWH, OGI/IIC/IB, OGI/IIC/PI,
 OGI/TAB1, OGI/TAB2, DOE/EI/PS, DOE/WE, OPCTR/EALA, PLANFAC-E (), RF,
 SOV/CS/CM, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/PA/F/S, TF-E (), FILE, DDO-4, DDA,
 LA/CATF-3, LA/RR, SE/XLA, C/IAD, CI/CLFL, CPAS/CDG, CR/WH, CS/REG,
 CTG/ISB-3, D/FBIS-2, D/QMS, EPS/EG-2, IAD/CTG-4, IAD/IC, IAD/PEL,
 ICS/HC/LA, INT/RR, NICAG/LA, NICAG/TWI, NIO/ECON, NIO/LA, DIA/TWSS, OTS,
 PAD, PPD, SAG/LIB, SAG/MEB, SAG/PPB, SAG/SEB-3, SECUR-2, (48/W)

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TDR: 310106Z DEC 83

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 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 O 310026Z DEC 83
 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9417
 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
 RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 14271

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, XK, OAS, USUN SHUM
 SUBJECT: CONTADORA PROCESS: NEGOTIATING WITH THE COM-
 MUNISTS?

REF: (A) PANAMA 12532; (B) MANAGUA 6057; (C) TEGU-
 CIGALPA 12287; (D) TEGUCIGALPA 14179; (E) PANAMA
 012532

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AS THE CONTADORA PROCESS CONTINUES AND
 PRESSURE GROWS ON THE SANDINISTAS, CONTADORA IS
 BEGINNING TO TAKE ON THE APPEARANCE OF A SERIOUS
 NEGOTIATION. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH NICARAGUA
 AND ITS SPONSORS AND OF THE CONTADORA FOREIGN MINI-
 STERS, WHOSE PRESTIGE IS MUCH INVOLVED IN THE SUCCESS
 OF CONTADORA, TO NURTURE THIS APPEARANCE. AS THEY
 APPROACH THIS PHASE OF CONTADORA, NICARAGUA IS THROW-
 ING OUT A STEADY STREAM OF PROPOSALS, SOME OF WHICH
 SOUND FORTHCOMING, AND RESOLUTELY AVOIDING THOSE
 ELEMENTS MOST DESIRED BY AND MOST CRITICAL TO THE
 INTERESTS OF THE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS. WE BELIEVE
 THE U.S. POSTURE MUST BE MUCH MORE OPEN AT THIS
 POINT. USG POLICY STATEMENTS SHOULD UNDERLINE THE
 WEAKNESSES OF THE NICARAGUAN POSITION. WE ALSO
 SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, IN THE END, CONTADORA IS
 A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION WITH A COMMUNIST STATE.
 THUS, WE SHOULD REITERATE REGULARLY THE REQUIREMENTS
 OF COMPLETENESS, SIMULTANEITY, VERIFICATION, AND
 ENFORCEMENT WHICH MUST BE FULFILLED BEFORE AN AGREE-
 MENT WITH NICARAGUA, OF SUCH IMPORT TO THE NATIONAL
 SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS CENTRAL
 AMERICAN ALLIES, CAN BE MADE ACCEPTABLE. END
 SUMMARY.

3. THE AGREEMENT ON THE DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES BY
 THE NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAS NOW BEEN FOLLOWED BY
 A RELATIVELY DETAILED PRESCRIPTION BY THE CONTADORA
 FOUR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE OBJECTIVES.
 (REF A); PROPOSALS WHICH ARE SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT IN

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TOR: 310106Z DEC 83

MANY RESPECTS AS POINTED OUT BY EMBASSY MANAGUA (REF B). AT THE SAME TIME, THE GRN CONTINUES TO THROW OUT A STREAM OF PROPOSALS, SOME FORMAL AND SOME ONLY IN THE FORM OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS, DESIGNED TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC THAT THE SANDINISTAS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SERIOUS CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON THEIR OWN REVOLUTION. THUS, THE CONTADORA PROCESS IS INCREASINGLY BEING VIEWED AS A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH THE GRN AND THE CONTADORA FOUR CONTINUE TO TAKE POSITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE AN ACCEPTABLE AND RELIABLE AGREEMENT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH. OBVIOUSLY, THE GRN IS DELIBERATELY EMPHASIZING THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES WHICH DEAL WITH ITS CONCERNS WHILE REJECTING, IGNORING, OR OBFUSCATING POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE CORE FOUR. OF GREATER CONCERN IS THE FACT THAT, WHILE CONTADORA HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT LEARNING PROCESS FOR THE CONTADORA FOUR, UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONTADORA FOUR POSITIONS CONTINUE OFTEN TO HAVE THE SAME EFFECT.

5. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE PRO-NICARAGUAN BIAS OF THE MEXICANS. THERE IS ALSO A BUILT-IN PRESSURE FOR PROGRESS AT ANY COST ARISING FROM THE NEED THAT CONTADORA FOUR FOREIGN OFFICES FEEL TO JUSTIFY THEIR ROLE. FINALLY, HOWEVER, WE MUST FEEL THAT, IN PART, THE DEFICIENCIES IN CONTADORA FOUR POSITIONS ARISE FROM NAIVETE AND A LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN NEGOTIATING WITH COMMUNIST STATES. THUS, CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF TIMING, COMPLETENESS AND VERIFICATION ARE REGULARLY DEALT WITH IN AN INADEQUATE FASHION. THE TRUTH IS THAT THE DEMOCRACIES HAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON THESE MATTERS. IN OUR CASE, AGREEMENTS WILL BE SELF-ENFORCING WHILE BITTER EXPERIENCE TELLS US THAT THEY WILL BE VIOLATED BY THE COMMUNISTS IF THAT IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXCESSIVE COST.

6. AS WE HAVE NOTED PREVIOUSLY, EMBASSY BELIEVES THE USG HAS BEEN TOO RELUCTANT TO SPEAK OUT ON CON-

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XK, OAS, USUN SHUM

SUBJECT: CONTADORA PROCESS: NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMUNISTS?

TADORA MATTERS IN SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES' POSITIONS. CLEARLY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ALLOW THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES RATHER THAN HAVING AN AGREEMENT IMPOSED FROM THE OUTSIDE. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN THE WEIGHT OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS IS TO PRESS INADEQUATE OR UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS ON THE CORE FOUR STATES, THE USG REMAINS SILENT AT ITS PERIL. INDEED, A GENERAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS WITHOUT OUTLINING OUR OWN VIEWS MORE SPECIFICALLY ADDS TO THE PRESSURE ON THE CORE FOUR TO ACCEPT CONTADORA PROPOSALS.

7. WE BELIEVE THE USG CAN NO LONGER SAFELY MAINTAIN THIS POSTURE. IF THE CORE FOUR SUCCEED TO THE PRESSURE AND ACCEPT AN INADEQUATE AGREEMENT, OUR SECURITY-INTERESTS SUFFER. IF THEY REFUSE AND THEIR POSITION IS INADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD, THEY AND WE STAND TO BE BLAMED FOR A FAILURE OF CONTADORA.

8. MANAGUA COMMENTS THAT OUR COMMENTS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS NEED TO BE SEEN AS SUBSTANTIVE AND NON-OBSTRUCTIONIST. THIS IS NO DOUBT TRUE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, WHILE WE CAN WELCOME SIGNS

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ON THE PART OF THE GRN OF A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE POINT OUT THE CONTINUING CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE GRN POSITION AND THAT WE DO THIS ON A MORE OR LESS REGULAR BASIS IF OUR CONCERNS ARE EVENTUALLY TO BE ADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD PUBLICLY.

9. IN REF C, WE POINTED OUT SOME OF THE WEAKNESSES IN THE FOUR DRAFT TREATIES PRESENTED BY THE GRN TO THE USG. IN REF D, THE GOH ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN THESE AND OTHER GRN PROPOSALS IS REPORTED. THUS, WE SHOULD WELCOME INCREASED SIGNS OF GRN WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE BUT POINT OUT:

- NO CONCESSIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE HAVE YET BEEN MADE.
- CRITICAL ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS EQUILIBRIUM (AS OPPOSED TO AN ARMS FREEZE), DEMOCRATIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT AND VERIFICATION ARE EITHER OMITTED OR DEALT WITH INADEQUATELY.
- DESPITE THE GRN'S NOMINAL AGREEMENT TO A MULTI-LATERAL FORUM, IT REGULARLY RENEWS ITS EFFORTS TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS AND SEEK ARRANGEMENTS IN BI-LATERAL CHANNELS.
- A REGULAR GRN TACTIC IS TO PROPOSE TIMING WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS ON MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE SANDINISTAS WHILE LEAVING TO A LATER OR INDETERMINATE TIME ELEMENTS WHICH THEY WOULD WISH TO AVOID OR OBSTRUCT.

10. IT ALSO SEEMS IMPORTANT TO US TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE CONTADORA PROCESS IS, IN FACT, A NEGOTIATION WITH A COMMUNIST STATE. THE CONTADORA FOUR ARE USEFUL FACILITATORS BUT, ULTIMATELY, THE NEGOTIATION IS NOT WITH THEM BUT WITH NICARAGUA. THE GRN RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT BISHOP SALVADOR SCHLAEFER HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED AND MURDERED BY THE CIA WHILE THE SANDINISTAS THEMSELVES WERE IN HOT PURSUIT OF THE REFUGEE COLUMN; PRESUMABLY IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT REPORTS OF THE BISHOP'S DEATH WERE NOT UNDULY EXAGGERATED. WITH SUCH A NEGOTIATING PARTNER, THE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS OBVIOUSLY PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON TIMING, ENFORCEMENT AND VERIFICATION.

11. THUS, IN OUR OWN COMMENTS ON CONTADORA, IT BECOMES EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT:

- WHILE THE CONTADORA FOUR PROVIDE A VERY USEFUL FORUM WITHIN WHICH A RESOLUTION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN TENSIONS CAN BE SOUGHT, THE AGREEMENT ITSELF MUST BE AMONG THE CENTRAL AMERICANS THEMSELVES.
- WHILE THE CONTADORA FOUR MAY CHOOSE TO SUBMIT THEIR OWN PROPOSALS, THIS SEEMS LESS USEFUL TO US, AND THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE VIEWED ONLY AS CATALYSTS FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION AND NOT AS SOMETHING TO BE IMPOSED ON THE CENTRAL AMERICANS.
- THE END SOUGHT IS AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES TO END REGIONAL TENSIONS.
- ONE OF THESE STATES, NICARAGUA, IS A COMMUNIST STATE WHICH HAS LENT ITSELF TO SOVIET PURPOSES.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XK, OAS, USUN SHUM

SUBJECT: CONTADORA PROCESS: NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMUNISTS?

- IT IS ESSENTIAL IN SUCH A CASE THAT BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OR OBLIGATION, AN AGREEMENT BE COMPLETED WHICH:

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TOR: 310106Z DEC 83

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- ADDRESSES THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF ALL PARTIES
- CALLS INTO FORCE ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY
- IS VERIFIABLE
- HAS EFFECTIVE MACHINERY FOR VERIFICATION AGREED UPON AND IN PLACE
- IS ENFORCEABLE

- HAS EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT
AGREED UPON AND AVAILABLE.

12. OBVIOUSLY, THE CONTADORA FOUR DRAFT PROPOSALS
(REF E) ARE SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT IN MANY OF THE ABOVE
RESPECTS.

13. WE HAVE JUST READ SAN SALVADOR'S 12078 AND THINK
IT IS RIGHT ON THE MARK. NEGROPONTE

END OF MESSAGE

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SECRETNIO/LA
INCOMING

12/ /

IMMEDIATE

FRP: .2. .4. . . .8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/HO-2, ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/R, ALA/PO/LA, CRW,
 ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OGI/DD/E, OGI/EC/TW, OGI/IIC/IB, OPCTR/EALA,
 PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/PA/F/S, SOV/PA/S,
 TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3, LA/RR, D/OCR-3, NICAG/LA, NIO/ECON, NIO/LA,
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TOR: 010352Z JAN 84

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 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9423
 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 BT
 S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 14276

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, XK
 SUBJECT: CONTADORA NEXT STEPS

REF: (A) SAN SALVADOR 12078; (B) TEGUCIGALPA 14179;
 (C) TEGUCIGALPA 14171

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR PICKERING'S PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION
 PARA SIX REFFEL A STRIKES US AS MERITING DEPARTMENT'S
 EARLIEST POSSIBLE ATTENTION. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT
 THAT USG HAVE AT LEAST PRELIMINARY POSITIONS TO CONVEY
 TO CORE FOUR ON SUBJECTS RAISED BY SAN SALVADOR IN TIME
 FOR CORE FOUR VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING JAN
 4 AND 5 IN PANAMA.

3. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESPECIALLY
 URGENT THAT DEPARTMENT DO ITS OWN DETAILED ANALYSIS
 OF LATEST CONTADORA DOCUMENT AS BASIS FOR OUR COMMENTS
 TO CORE FOUR AND FOR POSSIBLE PUBLIC USE.

4. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE STRUCK BY SIMILARITIES IN
 DEFICIENCIES OF CONTADORA DOCUMENT WITH PITFALLS WE
 SAW IN NICARAGUA'S FOUR DRAFT TREATIES. (TEGUCIGALPA
 12287). CONTADORA DRAFT SIGNALS FOR IMMEDIATE IM-
 PLEMENTATION ISSUES OF GREATER CONCERN TO NICARAGUA
 AND DEFERS TO LATER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES OF GREATER
 IMPORT FOR NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS. ALSO, OBLIGATIONS
 OF GREATEST INTEREST TO NICARAGUA ARE VIRTUALLY SELF-
 IMPLEMENTING (AT LEAST FOR OUR SIDE); WHEREAS MANY
 OF THE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO CORE FOUR WOULD BE REFERRED
 TO CUMBERSOME AND POSSIBLY INCONCLUSIVE NEGOTIATING
 PROCESS. NEGROPONTE
 END OF MESSAGE

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SECRETNIO/LA
INCOMING

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FRP: .2. .4. . . .8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/ES-2, ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/E2, ALA/MC/R,
ALA/PO/LA, ALA/SA/R, ALA/SEM, ALA/SW/SW1, CRW, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S,
OGI/DD/E, OGI/EC/TM1, OGI/EC/TW, OGI/IIC/IB, ODE/EI/MA, OPCTR/EALA,
PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/PA/F/S, SOV/PA/S,
TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3, LA/RR, C/IAD, D/DCR-3, ICS/HC/LA, NICAG/LA,
NIO/ECON, NIO/LA, DIA/TWSS, SAG/PPB, SAG/SEB-3. (18/W)

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TOR: 010629Z JAN 84

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C 010136Z JAN 84 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1731
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 00004

EXDIS

ARA FOR ASSISTANT SECY MOTLEY, S/S FOR AMB STONE

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XL, US, ES

SUBJECT: CHAVEZ-MENA: CONTADORA AND THE CORE FOUR

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: CHAVEZ-MENA PROPOSES TO WORK OUT WITH CORE FOUR A PROPOSAL IN WHICH THEY WOULD: (A) SUBMIT THEIR COMMENTARIES ON NICARAGUAN TREATIES; (B) PROVIDE A COUNTERPART DOCUMENT TO THE DECEMBER 20-21 CONTADORA DRAFT WHICH WOULD CONTAIN THEIR SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS AND AN OUTLINE OF A PROGRAM FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE THREE WORKING GROUPS -- SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC; AND (C) NOT SUBMIT THE 42 ARTICLE CORE FOUR TREATY DRAFT (TEXT SEPTTEL). FIDEL WILL SEND HIS OAS AMBASSADOR FIRST TO TEGUCIGALPA ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 3, THEN TO GUATEMALA. CORE FOUR WILL MEET IN SAN JOSE THURSDAY, JANUARY 6 TO PREPARE FOR UPCOMING MEETING AT WHICH FIDEL HOPES TO SELL COSTA RICANS ON THIS PROCESS. HE ASKS OUR HELP. HE WILL HAVE HIS DRAFT OF SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT (B ABOVE) READY JANUARY 2 AND HOPES TO HAVE HIS ENVOY SEE AMBASSADOR STONE IN GUATEMALA JANUARY 3. END SUMMARY.

3. CHAVEZ-MENA GAVE ME A COPY OF CORE FOUR 42 ARTICLE DRAFT TREATY AND PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE (PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE) AND OF CONTADORA DOCUMENT "NORMAS PARA LA EJECUCION DE LOS COMPROMISOS ASUMIDO EN EL DOCUMENTO DE OBJETIVOS" PLUS ITS TWO ANNEXES DECEMBER 31. (FIRST DOCUMENT SEPTTEL; WE ASSUME DEPARTMENT HAS ALL PARTS OF SECOND SET.)

4. HE EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY POINTS OF THE CONTADORA DOCUMENT. A MORATORIUM IS UNACCEPTABLE TO EL SALVADOR AND THE REST OF THE ITEMS ARE EITHER POLITICALLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY TO ACCEPT OR INSUFFICIENT IN THEIR SCOPE AND VERIFICATION ELEMENTS.

5. HE PROPOSES TO PREPARE A CORE FOUR COUNTER DRAFT. HE WANTS TO BASE IT FIRMLY ON THE 21 POINTS -- PERHAPS EVEN JUST REPEATING THOSE POINTS. HE THEN WANTS TO USE THAT DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING THE HONDURAN IDEA

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OF WORKING GROUPS. THE COUNTER DRAFT WOULD INCLUDE ENOUGH POINTS TO INSURE THAT EACH HEADING WAS IN EFFECT AN OUTLINE WORK PROGRAM FOR THE GROUPS. THE DRAFT WOULD ASK FOR AGREEMENT ON THE GROUPS AND THEIR WORK PROGRAM BY FEBRUARY 15. THE GROUPS WOULD REPORT TO A TECHNICAL COMMISSION OVERSEEN BY THE MINISTERS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN FIVE WITHIN THREE MONTHS. THE GROUPS WOULD PREPARE TECHNICAL REPORTS, DRAFT TREATY PROPOSALS AND OTHER INFORMATION TO BE USED BY THE TECHNICAL COMMISSION TO PUT TOGETHER A DRAFT TREATY TEXT.

6. CHAVEZ-MENA INDICATES, AS GOOD AS IT IS, HE DOES NOT WANT TO PUT FORWARD THE CORE FOUR TREATY TEXT. HE FEELS THERE MUST BE A NEGOTIATION OF TEXTS AMONG THE FIVE TO INSURE THAT DETAILS ARE TAKEN CARE OF AND POSITIONS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. PERMITTING THE CONTADORA TO JUMP IMMEDIATELY FROM THE DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES TO A FULL TREATY TEXT WITHOUT NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A DISASTER AS THE "NORMAS" DOCUMENT INDICATES.

7. I URGED CHAVEZ-MENA TO CONSIDER THREE OR FOUR POINTS. THERE HAD TO BE MORE CORE FOUR SUBSTANCE ON THE TABLE, INCLUDING MORE ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND HOW TO PROVIDE FOR CAREFUL VERIFICATION AND CONTROL OF ANY SECURITY STEPS. THE CORE FOUR HAD BEEN WEAK ON SUBSTANCE UP TO NOW. THEY COULD DRAW ON THEIR DRAFT TREATY TO DO THIS. HE AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD WORK ON HIS DRAFT COUNTER DOCUMENT TO THE "NORMAS" IN THAT SENSE. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HONDURAS HE AGREED ENTIRELY. FINALLY, I SUGGESTED THAT DRAFT TREATY ARTICLES AT SOME POINT IN THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO REINFORCE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CORE FOUR. HE SAID HE AGREES.

8. WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY TO REVIEW HIS PROPOSED CORE FOUR DOCUMENT PRIOR TO HIS SENDING OSCAR CASTRO, HIS OAS AMBASSADOR, TO TEGUCIGALPA AND GUATEMALA. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH MEANWHILE, IF HE CAN REACH HIM, WITH PAZ BARNICA SINCE HE RECOGNIZES THAT MOST OF THESE IDEAS ARE ORIGINALLY HONDURAN OR SHAPED BY PAZ PERSONALLY. HE HOPES TO HAVE CASTRO SEE AMBASSADOR STONE IN GUATEMALA IN THE HOPES THAT WE CAN HELP SELL THIS APPROACH. HE BELIEVES GUATEMALA WILL AGREE TO HOLD BACK ON THE CORE FOUR TREATY DRAFT FOR NOW, BUT IS WORRIED ABOUT THE "FICOS."

EXDIS

ARA FOR ASSISTANT SECY MOTLEY, S/S FOR AMB STONE

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XL, US, ES

SUBJECT: CHAVEZ-MENA: CONTADORA AND THE CORE FOUR

9. BASICALLY, FIDEL SEES THE NEXT STAGE OF CONTADORA WORKING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE COMMISSIONS AND GROUPS AMONG THE CENTRAL AMERICAN FIVE. KEY WILL BE WHETHER NICARAGUA WILL EVER RESOLVE ITS POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE FOUR. THE TREATY PROCESS CAN HELP PUSH THIS OR ALTERNATIVELY EXPOSE THE NICARAGUAN RELUCTANCE ON KEY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL ISSUES.

10. COMMENT: CHAVEZ-MENA WANTS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US AT THIS STAGE. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY EARLY REACTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OR OTHERS, PARTICULARLY FROM CORE FOUR EMBASSIES, ON POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS. I WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S THOUGHTS ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE POINTS WHICH WE MIGHT ASK CHAVEZ-MENA TO INCLUDE IN HIS DOCUMENT. PICKERING

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ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/ES-2, ALA/MC, ALA/MC/CC, ALA/MC/D,
ALA/MC/M1, ALA/MC/M2, ALA/MC/R, ALA/MC/RAE, ALA/MC/RAM, ALA/N-2,
ALA/PO/LA, ALA/RCU-2, CRW, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, DGI/IIC/IB,
DGI/ISI/CP, OPCTR/EALA, PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS/CF, SOV/CS/S/M,
SOV/CS/Y, SOV/PA/F/A, SOV/PA/F/S, SOV/PA/S, TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3,
LA/CO-2, LA/RR, C/IAD, CRES/ARD, D/OCR-3, DCD-3, ICS/HC/LA, NICAG/LA,
NIO/ECON, NIO/LA, OIA/TWSS, SAG/PPB, SAG/SEB-3, (24/W)

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CONFIDENTIAL HAVANA 8040

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CU, NU, US, ES
SUBJ: CUBAN VIEWS ON CONTADORA PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE 21 OBJECTIVES

REF: PANAMA 12530

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. JOSE ANTONIO ARBEZU, HEAD OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, AT LUNCH ON DECEMBER 29 RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE PROPOSALS RECENTLY SET FORTH BY THE CONTADORA FOUR FOR IMPLEMENTING THE TWENTY ONE OBJECTIVES. AFTER I HAD FOBBERED OFF HIS QUESTION REGARDING OUR VIEWS ON THE GROUNDS THAT I HAD NOT YET SEEN THE DOCUMENT, ARBEZU SAID THAT THE CUBANS FOUND THE PROPOSALS TO BE "IMPRECISE" AND THEREFORE DETRIMENTAL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ALL PARTIES. HE ADDED THAT THE GOC HAD EXPECTED AND HOPED FOR A MORE FINISHED DOCUMENT. IN HIS VIEW, THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUCH A DOCUMENT AT THIS TIME MEANS THAT THE CONTADORA PROCESS WILL BE STRUNG OUT INTO THE DANGEROUS MONTHS AHEAD. ASIDE FROM THESE GENERAL REMARKS, ARBEZU ALSO RESTATED THE NOW-STANDARD CUBAN POSITION THAT THE CONTADORA PROPOSALS DO NOT ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH THE "PROBLEM" OF EL SALVADOR.

3. BY WAY OF EXPLAINING THE "IMPRECISION" IN THE DOCUMENT, ARBEZU NOTED THE TREATMENT OF MILITARY ADVISORS. HE REFERRED TO THE VARIOUS NORMS OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I, IN RESPONSE, SAID THAT WE HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS. NOT ONLY DO WE DISAGREE ABOUT THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA, BUT WE HAVETAKEN FULL NOTE OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE NON-MILITARY CUBAN ADVISORS. SUCH A SITUATION, I OBSERVED, UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF MEANINGFUL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. GIVEN THAT PROBLEM, I NOTED, IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT WE HOPE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL CUBAN ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA. ARBEZU IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE FELT THAT A COMPLETE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WAS WITHIN THE CARDS PROVIDED IT WAS RECIPROCATED.

4. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION CLEARLY WAS AN ATTEMPT

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AT ENGAGEMENT, COMPLETE WITH THE LURE OF A POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN ADVISORS FROM NICARAGUA. THE GOC'S POST-GRENADA FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW PROBABLY HAS BEEN COMPLETED. AS WE SUSPECTED, THAT REVIEW SEEMS TO BE LEADING TO A SOFTER LINE TACTICALLY. THE APPARENT CUBAN DESIRE TO ACCELERATE AND STRENGTHEN THE CONTADORA PROCESS (A DESIR THAT CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE CUBAN POSITION OF SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS AGO) PROBABLY REFLECTS AFEAR THAT THE USG HAS ALREADY DECIDED TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. IN CUBAN EYES, THE GRENADIAN EPISODE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE USG HAS THE WILL TO ACT WHEN EVENTS IN THE REGION SO DICTATE; EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR MAY SOON DICTATE USG INTERVENTION (SEPTTEL); SUCH ACTIONS WILL NECESSARILY UNDERMINE THE SANDINISTAS; ERGO, THE USG MUST BE RESTRAINED VIA THE CONTADORA PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. ADMITTEDLY MY CONVERSATION WITH ARBEZU REPRESENTS THE SOFT LINE TACTIC IN ITS SIMPLEST AND MOST TENTATIVE FORM BUT, IN THE CUBAN CONTEXT, CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS CASUAL CONVERSATION. I DID NOT LET THE CONVERSATION CONTINUE VERY FAR, BOTH FOR WANT OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR CURRENT VIEWS AND BECAUSE CONVERSATION WITH THE CUBANS ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD BE CAREFULLY STAG-MANAGED. THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, CAN OBVIOUSLY BE REOPENED AT ANY TIME. I WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE IN THIS REGARD.

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END OF MESSAGE

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